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Good intentions are no substitute for sound economic regulation. Using the ‘in-
vestment ladder’ as the stick and ‘access holidays’ as the carrot is hardly an ef-
fective way to generate competition. On the contrary, this approach creates a 
regulatory spiral. What regulators plead for today is in effect an obligatory shar-
ing regime for nearly all network elements. However, this splitting up of net-
works into their elements by ad hoc regulatory interventions is destroying con-
sumer welfare. Instead, rule-based regulation of network-specific market power 
should be implemented by means of a disaggregated regulatory mandate, limit-
ing incentive regulation to essential facilities as a whole. 
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1.      Introduction 
 
The starting point of joint work with Beat Blankart was at those times when 
market entry was still forbidden by law in major parts of telecommunications 
networks in European countries. Therefore, it seemed to be a natural research 
question to ask what we can learn from comparative institutional analysis. How 
can one explain the extensive deregulation of interstate telecommunications in 
the U.S. compared to the lagging telecommunications deregulation intrastate in 
the U.S. and intracountry in Europe and in Germany in particular? It soon be-
came clear that the normative theory of economic regulation cannot be sufficient 
to answer such questions. Rather, a political-economy approach, taking into ac-
count the role of bureaucracy, has been indispensable (Blankart, Knieps, 1989). 
In the meantime market entry is allowed in all parts of telecommunications mar-
kets in the U.S. as well as in Europe. Nevertheless, sector-specific regulation 
still plays an important role. 
 
In the earlier years of market liberalisation within the EU the regulatory focus 
was on initiating service competition with subsequent obligations of different 
forms of interconnections (including transit interconnections) at regulated low 
tariffs. Since the EU Review 1999 and subsequent reforms of national telecom-
munications laws, the focus has increasingly shifted towards the role of infra-
structure competition. In long-distance networks the potentials of infrastructure 
competition have been increasingly realized with the emergence of competing 
telecommunications networks on the national and international levels. The ques-
tion arises to what extent infrastructure competition could also be realized in 
local telecommunications networks which were traditionally considered mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks, characterised by a combination of natural monopoly and 
irreversible costs, and what role regulatory intervention should play in stimula-
ting developments towards infrastructure competition in local networks, too. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show that while infrastructure competition is in-
deed an important objective, it should not lead to the fallacies of regulatorily 
promoted infrastructure competition by means of regulatory micro-management. 
Ad-hoc discretionary regulatory interventions bear the danger of excessive regu-  2
lation due to an oversize regulatory basis as well as an unsuitable mix of regula-
tory instruments. Firstly, the role of mandatory unbundling
1 and the subsequent 
incentives for competitors to later invest in their own facilities (‘stepping stones 
hypothesis’ or ‘ladder of investment’ approach) first promoted by the FCC in 
1997 are analysed. It is shown that the ‘ladder of investment’ approach either 
results in an oversized regulatory basis, when the unbundling of competitive 
subparts of telecommunications infrastructure is made mandatory, or in undue 
regulation of monopolistic bottleneck parts, thereby destroying the advantages 
of the natural monopoly with subsequent inefficient cost-duplication. The ‘step-
ping stone hypothesis’ has already been criticized from a broad competition pol-
icy point of view pointing out the impossibility of regulatory omnipotence (e.g. 
Oldale, Padilla, 2004). Furthermore, criticism from the perspective of empirical 
consequences exists, in particular pointing out its ineffectiveness due to the 
regulator’s failure to impose credible commitments to insure that access seekers 
have incentives to invest in their own facilities (Hausman, Sidak, 2005, p. 69). 
However, network theoretical analysis to provide a superior alternative to regu-
latory micro-management is still lacking. 
 
In the meantime a second form of regulatory micro-management termed ‘access 
holidays’ gains increasing attention. ‘Access holidays’ means a significant pe-
riod during which an investor is free from access regulation. Until now, the ba-
sic argument in favour of ‘access holidays’ is the negative incentive for invest-
ments caused by expected regulatory opportunism such that fully compensated 
ex ante risk associated with project failure is not guaranteed. The idea is that 
such a holiday will increase investment incentives by allowing profits unhin-
dered by regulatory intervention within a period (e.g. Gans, King, 2003). 
 
The strict application of the ‘ladder of investment’ approach will lead to increas-
ing regulatory interventions with a subsequent increase of regulatory opportun-
                                                 
1   A careful application of the term unbundling is required. Whereas in electricity un-
bundling describes the separation between electricity generation and transmission 
networks, in telecommunication unbundling may have different meanings. Unbun-
dling may differ between services and infrastructure, between long-distance and local 
networks; within the local loop several forms (full unbundling, line sharing, cable 
canalisation access) are differentiated (e.g. Blankart, Knieps, Zenhäusern, 2007).   3
ism. This raises the issue of an adequate ‘antitoxin’ to cure the consequences of 
regulatory activity motivated by the ‘ladder’ approach. However, it is shown 
that ‘access holidays’ are an inadequate counter-strategy to compensate for regu-
latory failures caused by regulatory opportunism. ‘Access holidays’ can only be 
a relevant concept at all, if regulatory problems of network-specific market 
power still exist. However, to the extent that network infrastructures are mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks they should be regulated properly from the very begin-
ning, avoiding regulatory micro-management and a subsequent interventionist 
‘chain reaction’. 
 
To provide an alternative to regulatory micro-management the analytical con-
cept of a disaggregated regulatory mandate is applied (e.g. Knieps, 2005; 
Knieps, 2007, chapter 9). Statutory constraints have to be implemented in order 
to guarantee an unbiased development of infrastructure and service competition. 
Regulatory interventions into competitive subparts should be forbidden, whereas 
network-specific market power in the monopolistic bottleneck parts should be 
disciplined by adequate regulatory instruments. However, mandatory unbun-
dling in the form of bitstream access is an inadequate regulatory instrument and 
should not be pursued to split up network infrastructures.
2 If phasing out of mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks can be observed (e.g. due to inter-platform competition 
between digital subscriber line (DSL) and cable modems) mandatory unbund-
ling is superfluous anyway. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the fallacies of regulation-
induced infrastructure competition are presented. The concepts of ‘stepping 
stone hypothesis’ and ‘access holidays’ are explained, then assessed and finally 
an overview is given of the experiences made with these concepts in the EU and 
the US, respectively. Section 3 presents the need for a regulatory reform towards 
rule-based regulation as a remedy to control over-regulation. The concluding 
section 4 provides recommendations for the future reform process. 
 
                                                 
2  Similarly, in competition policy the dominant position of a firm is not subject to  
intervention, instead measures of competition policy focus on the abuse of the domi-
nant position.   4
2.  The fallacies of regulatorily promoted infrastructure competition  
 
In this section the most prominent concepts for stimulating infrastructure in-
vestments by regulatory micro-management are analysed: mandatory unbun-
dling and the ‘stepping stone hypothesis’ or ‘ladder of investment’ approach as 
well as ‘access holidays’. 
 
2.1  Systematisation of micro-managed regulation 
 
2.1.1  Unbundling and the ‘stepping stones hypothesis’ 
 
In the early days of deregulation the question of how regulatory policy can in-
fluence incentives to invest for incumbents and entrants led to the issue of man-
datory unbundling at regulated access prices (Farrell, 1997; Hausman, Sidak, 
2005, pp. 17-18).
3 It was later considerably transformed by the conviction that 
“the way to promote infrastructure competition is to make available easy and 
inexpensive access to the assets of the incumbent which are not replicable. At 
the outside this might include a large numbers of assets, which initially are com-
plements to the entrant’s investment, but with time become substitutes.” (Cave, 
2003, p. 16).
4 This concept immediately makes room for a large variety of regu-
latory discretion. Access points due to mandatory unbundling may be identified 
to guarantee an opportunity for entrants of gaining access to unbundled network 
components at any place of their choice as long as the identity of the non-
replicable/complementary assets inevitably varies with the nature of the en-
trant’s strategy. This might be achieved through a decision by the regulator to 
publish a schedule of prices over time, or to adapt a pricing principle which 
                                                 
3   “Leasing unbundled elements might become viewed more as a stepping-stone to in-
novate facilities-based competition, because a carrier who tries to rely permanently 
on the incumbent’s facilities would risk being overbuilt out of business not only by 
other competitors but also by the incumbent.” (Farrell, 1997, quotation can be found 
in the last section of chapter “4B(2): Two Possible Triggers for Wholesale Deregula-
tion”). 
4   The idea of the “ladder of investment” was already indicated in Cave, Prosperetti, 
2001, p. 421. For the context of narrowband see Cave, Vogelsang, 2003, p. 724; for 
the context of broadband see Cave, 2006, pp. 231 f.   5
would cause prices to rise. The logic of time-variant access pricing principles 
under which the prices of certain network resources are initially low, even below 
cost and therefore cross-subsidized, and then rise over time, would be influenced 
by the regulator’s preference for network duplication. According to this concept, 
it is mainly up to the regulator when and to what extent inter-platform-competi-
tion can emerge. The regulator should pick its way. 
 
Due to the low investment that entrants are assumed to make initially, they suf-
fer from a low service flexibility compared with a network operator. Figure 1 
illustrates this by considering different access modes and their corresponding 
total investment activities. Thus, according to the ‘ladder of investment’   
approach, entrants are starting their business activities by reselling services/ 
elements that are on the one hand not aligned with huge investment activities, 
but lead on the other hand to a low service flexibility in comparison with the de-
gree of freedom of a network operator. According to the ‘ladder of investment’ 
approach this low service flexibility should be compensated by cost-based and 
non-discriminatory access to specific access points (e.g. Cave, 2003, pp. 16-19). 
There is a differentiation between ‘wide eligibility’, where entrants have access 
to elements irrespective of their own level of investment and ‘narrow eligibility’ 
where this right depends upon the steps entrants have already taken on the ‘lad-
der of investment’. Thus, the regulation-induced backing of new entrants is not 
only understood to enable cost-oriented and non-discriminatory access to mo-
nopolistic bottleneck-facilities. It is in fact assumed that assets cannot unambi-
guously be classified in categories that are easily, with difficulty, or not at all  
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2.1.2  Regulation of breather permissions (‘access holidays’) 
 
Regulatory attention has increasingly shifted towards the incentives for invest-
ment and therefore the relation between access pricing and its linkage with in-
vestment incentives has been focused on (e.g. Newbery, 2000; Valletti, 2003). In 
this context there are further concepts besides the ‘ladder of investment’ ap-
proach. Increasing attention has been paid to the idea of a regulation-decreed 
breather permission, namely so-called ‘access holidays’, defined as a significant 
period during which an investor is free from access regulation. Since regulators 
cannot credibly commit to refraining from ‘clawing back’ rents after regulated 
firms have invested sunk costs, a truncation problem would result in rewarding 
only ex post successful projects, whereas the ex ante risks of project failures 
would not be compensated. Thus, socially desired investments may be delayed 
or don’t occur at all. Because regulators could not commit to an access price 
regulation that provides higher prices when the value of the investment turns out 
to be high than when it turns out to be low, the concept of a period completely   7
freed from price regulation – hence the term ‘access holiday’ – would have 
some appeal, because such a holiday might increase investment incentives by 




2.2 A  critical  appraisal  of micro-managed regulation 
 
To fully exploit the potential of competition in liberalised telecommunications 
markets, the regulatory process should be as lean as possible. The regulatory 
basis should not be extended beyond what is absolutely necessary. Symmetric 
regulatory conditions should neither advantage nor disadvantage the former 
network monopolist. “In general terms symmetric regulation means providing 
all suppliers, incumbents and new entrants alike, a level playing field on which 
to compete: the same price signals, the same restrictions, and the same obliga-
tions. ... But all forms of asymmetric regulation contain an intrinsic bias toward 
some firms or technologies ...” (Shankerman, 1996, pp. 5 f.). 
 
The ‘ladder of investment’ approach can be characterised as regulatory micro-
management leaving a large scope of discretion to the regulator. Neither the 
regulatory basis nor the application of regulatory instruments is constrained by 
rules. Rule-based regulatory actions, however, should limit the regulatory basis 
to areas with network-specific market power characterised as monopolistic bot-
tlenecks (e.g. Knieps, 1997; Knieps, 2005, p. 83; Laffont, Tirole, 2000, p. 98). 
The conditions governing a monopolistic bottleneck are met when: 
(1)  a facility is necessary for reaching customers, i.e. if no second or third 
such facility exists, in other words if there is no active substitute. This is 
the case when due to economies of scale and economies of scope a natural 
monopoly exists and a single provider is able to make the facility avail-
able more cheaply than several providers; 
(2)  at the same time the facility cannot reasonably be duplicated as a way of 
controlling the active provider, in other words when there is no potential 
substitute. This is the case when the costs of the facility are irreversible.   8
In contrast to the concept of monopolistic bottlenecks regulatory micro-
management is characterised by asymmetric regulation. As a consequence, regu-
lation by interventions into competitive subparts will result. This not only dis-
turbs the competitive process of infrastructure and service development, but also 
creates negative incentives for infrastructure investments. The ‘ladder of in-
vestment’ approach is based on the business model of competitors that initially 
have no network facilities. At its centre is a so-called ‘eligibility’ of new en-
trants and insofar the regulator’s midwife-function. 
 
However, the infrastructure owner should always have the competence to decide 
on the business model behind his infrastructure investment – irrespective of 
whether he is incumbent or entrant – because he has, after all, to bear the finan-
cial consequences. If, according to the business models of his competitors, some 
resources are not replicable, this does not mean that they already fulfil the char-
acteristics of a monopolistic bottleneck. Monopolistic bottlenecks are to be con-
sidered as a whole, focussing globally on the relevant infrastructure of the natu-
ral monopoly. Within monopolistic bottlenecks the network owner’s business 
model should be the relevant one. This company should provide non-dis-
criminatory access to monopolistic bottlenecks at cost-covering prices. If certain 
bottleneck-components are subsidised, incentives for excessive investments are 
created, ignoring the relevance of the viability of the existing infrastructure. 
 
The ‘ladder of investment’ approach doesn’t promote a phasing out of sector-
specific telecommunications regulation. On the contrary, it leads rather to a sys-
tematic extension of the regulatory basis and the introduction of new regulation. 
To be more specific, the concept seems compatible with the EU Commission’s 
regulatory framework for communications but is detrimental from an economics 
point of view, because it does not consistently distinguish between monopolistic 
bottleneck areas and competitive areas. As illustrated in figure 2, the ‘ladder of 
investment’ approach leads to an oversized regulatory basis. Therefore remedies 
are implemented in areas where competition is effective. This is specifically the 
case in connection with all elements that network operators have to offer to 
competitors beyond monopolistic bottlenecks. 
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Figure 2  Over-regulation generated by the ‘ladder of investment’ approach 
 
 
The ‘ladder of investment’ approach has already been criticised because of the 
ensuing network fragmentation (Oldale, Padilla, 2004, pp. 73-75). A network 
economic analysis reveals that this approach is a sophisticated methodology that 
leads to market and network fragmentation within and beyond monopolistic bot-
tlenecks. The general principle is that, based on regulated terms, the network 
owner has to deliver separate elements to his competitors. Instead of an incen-
tive-compatible regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks that have shrunken due 
to technological development, networks are rather broken up, irrespective of 
whether they constitute a monopolistic bottleneck or not. Instead of regulating 
the monopolistic bottleneck as a whole, the corresponding facilities are split up 
and concomitant economies of scope destroyed. Thus the viability of network 
facilities is threatened ad libitum, accordant with regulatory discretion. The con-
sequence is higher and presumably uncovered investment risk and therefore 
lower investment incentives for the incumbent as well as for entrant operators. 
The idea behind the approach is that a gradual increase in access prices should   10
motivate competitors who are initially supported by regulation to later duplicate 
network facilities. In a dynamic environment like liberalised communications 
markets, where network and service innovations are permanently taking place, 
this concept is particularly misleading. Players that have not engaged in huge 
investment so far are better off taking advantage of the option to wait (and see) 
how regulation is generating further rents for them. 
 
Basic characteristics of regulatory micro-management are asymmetric regulation 
with particular focus on the incentives to increase investment activities by new 
entrants. As a consequence of the increasing set of regulatory interventions regu-
latory uncertainty due to regulatory opportunism will increase. This is an impor-
tant reason why according to Hausman, Sidak (2005, p. 69), the ‘stepping stone 
hypothesis’ is pointless from the empirical point of view. 
 
Neither overregulation nor the absence of regulation within monopolistic bottle-
necks is the adequate answer to the regulatory commitment problem. This can 
already be seen by taking a closer look at the concept of ‘access holidays’. From 
an economic point of view, ‘access holidays’ can only be a relevant concept if 
regulatory problems of network-specific market power still exist, that is to say, 
if a new investment creates network-specific market power. The basic argument 
in favour of ‘access holidays’ is negative incentives for investments caused by 
the fact that regulators are not welfare maximisers and therefore can’t give a 
credible hostage, meaning that they succumb to ex post opportunism. Due to the 
sequential nature of investment decisions (ex ante) and regulation of access tar-
iffs (ex post) a regulation-induced truncation problem would arise. This would 
result in only ex post successful projects being rewarded, whereas the ex ante 
risks of project failure would remain uncompensated.
5 In any case, from an in-
vestor’s point of view all relevant ex ante risks should be covered. The challeng-
ing task is therefore the design of a credible regulatory mandate taking into ac-
count the problem of regulatory opportunism. 
 
                                                 
5   Under certain conditions it can even be shown that regulated access prices equal to 
short run variable costs would result in a unique Nash equilibrium and the utility 
would not invest (Newbery, 2000, pp. 34-36).   11
A closer look at consecutive implementation procedures shows that the decision 
as to what investment or which investor should get these ‘access holidays’ may 
be anything but a simple issue to tackle. If this is to be decided case-by-case – 
and another practice does not seem to be feasible –, the concept appears to be a 
standard example of the micro-management of discretionary regulatory absence. 
 
The question arises whether ‘access holidays’ are the adequate answer to the 
problem of regulatory opportunism from an economic point of view. It can be 
shown that the problem of regulatory opportunism is not caused by the nature of 
ex ante irreversible investment per se, but is based on the more general problem 
that regulatory agencies cannot be committed to welfare-maximising behaviour. 
Therefore, the regulatory agencies have to be constrained by statutes, not only to 
enforce the disaggregated regulatory mandate in order to properly discipline 
market power, but also to allow the compensation of ex ante risks of irreversible 
investments (Knieps, 2005, pp. 90f.). Thus, ‘access holidays’ become detrimen-
tal regulatory micro-management. 
 
 
2.3  Europe vs. United States: The opposite reform process 
 
From the perspective of the year 2000, the obligation imposed by the European 
Commission on incumbents to provide fully unbundled access lines, based on a 
so-called ‘Regulation’,
6 was a severe measure, because it came into force in 
member states without the procedural need to transform it into national law. But 
in comparison with the ambiguous foreseeable economic consequences of the 
‘ladder of investment’ approach, mere full unbundling can be considered as a 
less incisive intervention. Unbundled access and line sharing are in the mean-
time merely special cases of an increasing variety of possible obligations of ac-
cess to, and use of, specific network facilities according to Art. 12 of the Access 
                                                 
6   Regulation on unbundled access to the local loop (European Parliament and Council 
2000/0185 (COD), 5. Dec. 2000).   12
Directive.
7 Innovative developments like the decentralised nature of the Next 
Generation Network should in effect lead to less sector-specific market power 
regulation, but in the context of such a mindset this calls for the necessity to de-
fine further markets besides the current ones assigned by the commission. And 
as long as Art. 12 of this Directive is in effect, in combination with regulators 
following a practice in accordance with the ‘ladder of investment’ approach, 
market participants can count on further backing by regulators, e.g. having fa-
voured access to elements that are estimated important for succeeding in a Next 
Generation Network environment. A closer look at the Commission’s Decisions 
on article 7 procedures reveals that the evaluation of significant market power is 
strongly based on market share estimations. “Although market shares alone are 
not in themselves indicative of the presence or lack of market power, according 
to established case-law under EC competition rules (F.N. 8 in original) a market 
share in excess of 50 % is, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, in itself 
evidence of a dominant position (F.N. 9 in original)“.
8 The criteria in the Com-
mission’s Recommendation
9 were only considered (if at all) as supplementary.
10 
A consistent and economically well-founded analysis is lacking and it seems 
that innovators with a large market share are at present also the first to appear on 
the regulatory radar. 
 
The European Commission, through its regulatory framework for communica-
tions, promotes the ‘stepping stone’ approach.
11 The FCC did the same through 
                                                 
7   Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities 
(Access Directive), OJ L108/7, 24.4. 2002. 
8   Commission Decision of 20 February 2004, Cases FI/2003/0024 and FI/2003/0027, 
p. 5. 
9   European Commission, 2003. 
10  “On the basis of the analysis of the three criteria (F.N. 5 in original) PTS concludes 
that the notified markets are characterised by law barriers to entry (F.N. 6 in origi-
nal). Despite this conclusion, PTS conducts a SMP analysis of the notified markets 
on the grounds that these markets have previously been regulated (F.N. 7 in original) 
and that there is a link with the existing regulation in other, related markets” (EC 
Comments, 24. 06. 2005, Cases SE/2005/0195, SE/2005/0196, SE/2005/0197 and 
SE/2005/0198, p. 3). 
11  E.g. European Commission, 2004, p. 3.   13
its interpretation of the Telecommunications Act (§ 251 and 252) during the late 
1990s. They stressed the need for ‘stepping stones’ to further competition to the 
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) through use of the unbundled net-
work elements-platform (UNE-P) and resale provisions. However, the policy of 
the FCC was challenged repeatedly by court decisions on the basis of the so-cal-
led “necessary” and “impairment” criteria that can be understood as a micro-
managed rather than a rule-based interpretation of the essential facilities doc-
trine. Initially, a decision by the Supreme Court (1999) gave the FCC a reason to 
interpret their unbundled network elements rules in a “Remand Order” even 
more tightly, but this was later abrogated by the Circuit Court of Appeals 
(2002). 
 
At the beginning of 2003, the FCC managed to make the overdue change in 
regulatory policy, announced in a clear statement by its former Chairman: “The 
FCC must provide a regulatory framework that promotes facilities-based compe-
tition – where companies use their own equipment, rather than leasing it from a 
competitor – investment and innovation.”
12 Subsequently the FCC decided to 
ease their broadband unbundling requirement on incumbents in early 2003. And 
with the “Triennial Review Order”
13 later that same year and an “Order on Re-
mand” at the End of 2004
14 all requirements for ILECs to supply unbundled 
elements from fibre facilities and UNE-P offerings were abolished. In early 
2005, the FCC communicated new rules for network unbundling obligations of 
incumbent local phone carriers, whereby unbundling regulation remains in es-
sence reduced to the obligation that incumbents have to offer a narrowband 
channel for voice telephony to competitors. 
 
Unbundling of the local loop first began in 1995 in Hong Kong, where this regu-
lation has, however, in the meantime been radically scaled back (e.g. Crandall, 
                                                 
12  The citation can be found in a newspaper article that was written by Michael Powell 
and published on January 9, 2003 in the The Financial Times. 
13  Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 
FCC Rcd 16978, 2003. 
14  Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations, Order on Remand, FCC 04-290, 
2004.   14
2005, p. 15). In the US, where severe unbundled access rules were implemented 
in 1996 and had a duration of validity of about eight years, based on FCC Data 
on local telephone companies, most competitive local exchange carriers 
(CLECs) have ended up using simple resale, not climbing on the ‘ladder of in-
vestment’. According to empirical data (eg. Hazlett, 2005), the US example 
shows that the ‘ladder of investment’ approach indeed doesn’t work and regula-
tory policy had sufficient reasons to abandon it after a long trial period. Crandall 
et al. (2002, p. 325) also show that there “is little economic justification for 
regulating any broadband services, included those provided by incumbent local 
exchange carriers. There is no basis for assuming that monopoly power will de-
velop in the delivery of these services, but there is every reason to believe that 
regulation will reduce the incentives of carriers to invest in infrastructure and 
broadband content. Symmetrical regulation of the incumbent carriers and the 
cable operators is likely to be much worse than no regulation at all.” On this 
note, the FCC expected positive investment incentives in the course of retreating 
regulations. Thus, this sector-specific regulation was phased out, which should 
not be confused with ‘access holidays’. The abolished unbundling rules gave 
ILECs a strong incentive to invest in fibre and several of them have started  
major investment programmes since. 
 
“The U.S. unbundling framework had been very tedious and intrusive; the past 
eight years also illustrate that in an environment with increasing competition 
such detailed regulatory rules are not sustainable” (Bauer, 2004, p. 80). Going 
back to the European case, one may ask how the lesson from the US may be in-
terpreted and what policy implications are to be derived from this heavy-handed 
regulatory approach. In this context the question has been raised of how regula-
tion should be designed in order that a Next Generation Network environment 
and emerging markets in general may evolve and increase welfare, preferably in 
an undistorted manner (eg. Lewin, 2005). In the EU, the possibility of the regu-
lation of broadband access has not been challenged yet, even  though in the 
meantime its negative investment incentives are well-known. This enhances in a 
sense the attractiveness of a corrective in the form of the concept of so-called 
‘access holidays’. For example, the German government announced that it 
would exempt a fibre optic broadband network planned by Deutsche Telekom   15
from regulation for two to three years, a move considered as a precedent for 
other telecommunications markets in Europe (FT.com/Financial Times, Novem-
ber 13, 2005). But as already discussed, both concepts are misleading. Therefore 
the question arises what a well-founded economic approach to the problems 
raised but unsolved by micro-managed regulation might look like. The answer to 
this question has to be formulated with special regard to the market conditions 
evolving in a Next Generation Network environment. 
 
 
3.  Regulatory reform towards rule-based regulation 
 
Only a disaggregated regulatory mandate on the statutory level (EU Directives 
and national law) can finally constrain regulatory agencies to limit regulation to 
monopolistic bottlenecks, exploiting phasing-out potentials. The reference point 
for regulatory rules concerning access charges should be the coverage of the full 
costs of the monopolistic bottleneck in order to guarantee its viability. Therefore 
the regulatory agencies have to be constrained by statutes not only to properly 




3.1  Monopolistic bottlenecks and the concept of ‘essential facilities’ 
 
When applying rule-based regulation in order to discipline network-specific 
market power, the concept of ‘essential facilities’ is of crucial importance. A 
facility or infrastructure is termed essential if it simultaneously 
-  is indispensable for reaching consumers and/or for enabling competitors 
to do business, 
-  is not otherwise available on the market, and 
-  objectively cannot be duplicated by reasonable economic means. 
 
This concept suggests the connection to the essential facilities doctrine, derived 
from US antitrust law, which is meanwhile being increasingly applied in Euro-
pean competition law also (cf. e.g. Lipsky, Sidak, 1999). The doctrine states that   16
a facility is only to be regarded as essential if the following conditions are ful-
filled: entry to the complementary market is not effectively possible without ac-
cess to this facility; it is not possible for a supplier on a complementary market 
to duplicate this facility at a reasonable expense,
15 and there are also no substi-
tutes (Areeda, Hovenkamp, 1988).
16 
 
In the context of the disaggregated regulatory approach the essential facilities 
doctrine is no longer applied case by case – as is common in US antitrust law – 
but to an entire class of cases, namely, monopolistic bottleneck facilities charac-
terised by a combination of natural monopoly and irreversible costs in the rele-
vant range of demand. The design of non-discriminatory conditions of access to 
essential facilities must be specified in the context of the disaggregated regula-
tory approach. It is important in this context to view the application of the essen-
tial facilities doctrine in a dynamic context. Therefore, an objective for the for-
mulation of access conditions must be to not obstruct infrastructure competition 
by regulatory micro-management, but rather create incentives for the symmetric 
development of infrastructure and service competition by rule-based regulation. 
 
However, the EU-Commission, through its Art. 12 of the Access Directive, 
opens up the possibility of unnecessary and potentially harmful regulatory inter-
vention. It therefore regrettably takes a step backwards in comparison with its 
policy in 1998, when an ‘Access Notice’
17 extended the role of competition pol-
icy, pointing out the importance of the concept of “essential facilities”, indispen-
sable for reaching customers (section 68). If this essential principle is not under-
stood as an essential principle, discretionary regulatory behaviour will persist in 
the long term and micro-management will increasingly guide sector-specific 
regulation. 
                                                 
15  Thus it is not feasible to offer, for instance, a ferry service without access to ports. 
16  Occasionally an additional criterion for applying the essential facilities doctrine is 
formulated, namely, that the use of the facility is essential for competition on the 
complementary market, because it reduces prices or increases supply on this market. 
This criterion, however, merely describes the effects of access. 
17  Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector (Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles) 
(98/C265/02), Official Journal of the European Communities, 22. 8. 98, pp. 2-28).   17
3.2  Application of regulatory instruments to monopolistic bottlenecks 
 
The effect of a refusal of access to monopolistic bottleneck facilities can also be 
achieved by providing access only at prohibitively high tariffs. This shows that 
an effective application of the essential facilities doctrine must be combined 
with a suitable regulation of access conditions to bottlenecks with regard to 
price, technical quality, and timeframe. However, the fundamental principle of 
such a regulatory policy should be to strictly limit regulatory measures to those 
network areas where market power potential does indeed exist. A regulation of 
access tariffs to monopolistic bottlenecks must therefore not lead to a regulation 
of tariffs in network areas without market power potential. There are two further 
issues that have to be taken into account: On the one hand, the existence of 
competition on the service level should not lead to the conclusion that there is no 
market power potential on the upstream network level, as long as the latter ful-
fils the criteria of a monopolistic bottleneck (cf. Brunekreeft, 2003, pp. 89f.). On 
the other hand, there is the question of the minimum regulatory depth necessary 
to guarantee non-discriminatory access to essential facilities, without, however, 




3.3  Incentive Regulation of access charges 
 
The reference point for regulatory rules concerning access charges should be the 
coverage of the full costs of the monopolistic bottleneck (in order to guarantee 
the viability of the facility). Particularly when alternatives to bypass essential 
facilities are absent, the cost-covering constraint may not be sufficient to fore-
stall excessive profits. Therefore the instrument of price-cap regulation should 
be introduced (cf. e.g. Beesley, Littlechild, 1989). Its major purpose is to regu-
                                                 
18  Basically one has to differentiate between, on the one hand, the question whether, 
due to a monopolistic bottleneck, network-specific market power exists, and, on the 
other hand, the question what kind of regulatory intervention is suitable. Thus the so-
called Hausman-Sidak test argues that a regulatory obligation to unbundle the local 
loop is not justified, if, even without unbundling, the incumbent is not able to exer-
cise market power with regard to providing telecommunications services to end users 
(cf. Hausman, Sidak, 1999, pp. 425 f.; Hausman, 2002, p. 138).    18
late the level of prices, taking into account the inflation rate (consumer price in-
dex) minus a percentage for expected productivity increase. It seems important 
to restrict such price-cap regulation to the bottleneck components of networks, 
where market power due to monopolistic bottlenecks is really creating a regula-
tory problem. In other subparts of networks price-setting should be left to the 
competitive markets. 
 
Regulation of infrastructure access charges should be limited exclusively to 
price-capping. The basic principle underlying price-capping regulation is that 
price levels should be regulated in areas where there is network-specific market 
power. The benefits of price-capping in terms of efficiency improvements and 
future investment activities can only unfold if price-capping is applied in its 
“unadulterated” form and not combined with input-based profit regulation. Indi-




4.  Recommendations on the EU Communications reform process 
 
Looking forward to the reform process of the EU regulatory framework for 
communications the basic question arises, which policy consequences are to be 
drawn. The particular focus lies on the phasing-out potentials of sector-specific 
regulation due to increasing platform competition. 
 
 
4.1  Exploiting further phasing-out potentials of sector-specific market 
power regulation 
 
In a liberalised market, technological development is mainly a result of competi-
tion, not an expression of market power. Competitive and technological devel-
opment has led to a competitive market for long-distance transmission capacity 
(cf. Laffont, Tirole, 2000, p. 98). As a consequence, all markets on the retail 
level as well as those markets on the wholesale level focussing on long-distance   19
networks should be excluded from the list of markets that might possibly be 
regulated. 
 
Monopolistic bottlenecks in the local loop of traditional telecommunications 
networks are also partly diminishing. Although it is not possible at this point to 
predict exactly how long it will take for the monopolistic bottlenecks in the local 
loop to disappear completely, there cannot be any doubt that the regulation of 
monopolistic bottlenecks has to be viewed in a dynamic context, so that the po-
tential for phasing out sector-specific regulation in telecommunications can be 
fully exhausted. Network access possibilities depend on the peculiarities of the 
different relevant geographic markets; in any case all relevant alternatives 
should be taken into account in order to localise the remaining monopolistic bot-
tlenecks. Although monopolistic bottlenecks should be considered as a whole, 
due to technological progress, as already mentioned, its boundaries may shrink. 
The boundaries of local loops may shrink from encompassing local networks 
including local switches and copper cable to only cable canalisation. In particu-
lar, the search for alternative network upgrading strategies, for example, includ-
ing fibre optic and upgraded copper cables (by DSLAMs) should not be dis-
torted by regulatory intervention. As long as wireless broadband services are 
still not regarded as substitutes for wire-based broadband services, cable canali-
sation is presumably the only facility for which non-discriminatory access may 
still be justified. 
 
 
4.2  Implementing pragmatic ‘double’ and ‘triple play tests’ 
 
Since the comprehensive opening of the telecommunications market, the pres-
sure of innovation has increased as well in local networks. This has led to con-
siderable technological variety (e.g. optical fibre, wireless networks, interactive 
broadband cable networks, satellite technology) and a consequent increase in 
varieties of network access. As a consequence, broadband technologies are los-
ing the characteristics of a natural monopoly. Thus, effective platform competi-
tion becomes relevant, where alternative providers have control of all aspects of 
their networks and the subsequent services. Because of these rapid develop-  20
ments, the local loop facilities in bigger cities and agglomerations are increas-
ingly losing their character of monopolistic bottlenecks. Thus, one of the most 
important recommendations for the EU communications reform process is that 
sector-specific market power regulation is to be withdrawn totally in all geo-
graphic areas where parallel infrastructures are in place. Therefore, in order to 
gain a complete overview of the competition potentials it is necessary not only 
to focus on the traditional copper cable technology (in the local loop), but to also 
take into consideration the existence of alternative (broadband) access technolo-
gies. These alternatives vary within different parts of a country, but also between 
different countries, depending on the different histories of the networks and the 
strategies of the market participants etc. 
 
It is important that the phasing-out potential should be properly identified, in-
cluding the emergence of new access alternatives. Three kinds of transmission 
qualities may be differentiated, according to the range of products (narrowband, 
‘semi-high speed’ and high speed) provided. Firstly, regarding narrowband 
communications services, phasing-out of sector-specific market power regula-
tion should take place, where alternatives (e.g. GSM-networks) are available. 
Secondly, in places where alternative traditional ‘semi-high speed’ broadband 
networks (DSL-infrastructures, interactive broadband cable networks etc.) are 
available simultaneously, sector-specific regulation is completely detrimental 
(‘double play test’). Thirdly, where customers can choose between several pro-
viders that simultaneously offer high speed internet access and services com-
parable to video on demand on their networks, sector-specific regulation again is 
no longer justified (‘triple play test’). In an environment where broadband ser-
vices are offered based on more than one infrastructure owned by different play-
ers, it is no longer justified that one of them should be asymmetrically regulated. 
Such an environment fosters specific market participants, but not competition 
and consumer welfare as such. The tests mentioned have to be applied on a geo-
graphical basis and should explicitly be understood as a disaggregated regula-
tory mandate on the statutory level (EU Directives and national law).   21
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